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ABSTRACT
During the booms that precede crises in emerging economies, policy makers often struggle
to limit capital flows and their expansionary consequences. The main policy tool for this task is
sterilization -essentiallya swap of international reserves for public bonds. However, there is an
extensive debate on the effectiveness of this policy, with many arguing that it may be
counterproductive once the (over-) reaction of the private sector is considered. But what forces
account for the private sector's reaction remain largely unexplained. In this paper we provide a
model to discuss these issues. We emphasize the international liquidity management aspect of
sterilization over the traditional monetary one, a re-focus that seems warranted when the main
concern is external crisis prevention. We first demonstrate that policies to smooth expansion in
anticipation of downturns can be Pareto improving in economies where domestic financial markets
are underdeveloped. We then discuss the implementation and effectiveness of this policy via
sterilization. The greatest risk of policy arises in situations where policy is most needed -thatis,
when financial markets are illiquid. Our mechanism is akin to the "implicit bailout" problem,
although the central bank acts non-selectively and only intervenes through open markets in our
model. Illiquidity replaces corruption and ineptitude. In addition to an appreciation of the currency
and the emergence of a quasi-fiscal deficit, the private sector's reaction to sterilization may lead to
an expansion rather than the desired contraction in aggregate demand or nontradeables investment
and to a bias toward short term capital inflows. The main insights extend to international liquidity
management issues more generally.
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During the booms that invariably precede crises in emergingeconomies, policy makers often
struggle to limit capital flows and their expansionaryconsequences. They primarily rely on
tight monetary policy. In particular, they attempt to sterilizecapital inflows through an
open market sale of domestic bonds or increased reserve requirements.'
These sterilized interventions can be extremelylarge. During the early 1990s in Chile,
for example, the exchange intervention meant thatover three quarters of its large capital
inflowamounting to around seven percent of its GDP pet year —wentto international
reserves accumnlation at the central bank. The sterilization of this intervention increased
the ratio of international reserves to monetary base from 3.5 around1990 to over 6.0 by
1993. This pattern was repeated inmany emerging economies during the early 1990's, when
capital flows to the developing world surged. In fact most of the economies involved inthe
crises of the second half of the 1990's had heavily sterilized inflows.Illustratively, many of
these countries' central banks exhausted their stock oftreasury securities in the process,
and had to resort to alternative sterilization mechanisms (seee.g. Click (1998)).
While sterilization is a widely used tool, both policy makers and academics havewarned
that it comes along with a number of difficulties and risks.Building on the Mundell-
Fleming logic, many argue that sterilization is, at best, ineffective. When capital markets
are integrated and there is a simultaneous attempt to stabilize the exchangerate, the
central bank has no control over the money supply because theprivate sector can undo an
open market sale of bonds for money (Mundell (1962)). The policy literature, noting the
increase in capital inflows that accompany sterilization,argues that since it is these flows
that fuel what is perceived as an excessive expansion inaggregate demand and exchange rate
overvaluation, sterilization is counterproductive (e.g. Calvo et al. 1993, Williamson 1995,
Corbo and [fernandez 1996, Massad 1997).2 Building on Sargent and Wallace's(1981)
unpleasant monetary arithmetics, Calvo (1991) formally shows that, by raising domestic
'E.g., Calvo et al. (1993) p. 146 write: "Sterilized intervention has been the most popularresponse to
the present episode of capital inflows in Latin America." And so does the World Bank(1997), p. 181:
"Sterilization was the most widely and intensively used policyresponse to the arrival of capital inflows
among the countries in our sample." The sample included 22 emerging economies.
21n his statement on behalf of the Latin American Governors of the Fund at thejoint World Bank -IMF
annual meeting of the Board of Governors held in Hong Kong (1997), Massad writes: "Thehigh rate of
return or, capital in a booming economy attracts large inflows of external resources. These inflowsare further
encouraged by the appreciation of the domestic currency, which is characteristic of economies experiencing
rapid productivity growth. Capital flows stimulate domestic demand and could push up domestic interest
rates if the monetary authority safeguards domestic equilibrium. This, in turn, could provide a further
incentive for capital inflows. The probable outcome will be continued appreciation of the localcurrency, the
resulting risk of widening the current account deficit, and the greater danger that these capital flows will be
reversed should some negative external shock occur." (page 4, our emphasis).
1interest rates, the government increases its debt-service burden and creates a quasi-fiscal
deficit that may jeopardize the very stabilization attempt that is supposedly beingprotected
by the sterilization.
Uniformly this debate has viewed the effects of sterilization as arising from changes in
the composition of the government's liabilities (money versus bonds). However, as noted
above, in a typical sterilized intervention the central bank also accumulates substantial
international reserves as assets and some mix of domestic currency and bonds as liabilities,
while the private sector's balance sheet changes in the opposite direction. Weargue in this
paper that the impact that sterilization has on the asset side of the government's balance
sheet and on its counterpart in the private sector is central —andperhaps the chief factor
in understanding its consequences. That is, we emphasize the international liquidity
management aspect of sterilization over its monetary implications.
We build this view on two salient features of emerging economies vis-â-vis developed
ones: First, it is crisis-prevention rather than day-to-day fine-tuning that typically shapes
their macroeconomic policy. And second, external crises are invariably associated with a
country's shortage of international liquidity.3 The sovereign debt literature echoes both
of these points (see Eaton and Gersowitz (1981), Bulow and Rogoff (1989)). A country's
debt capacity is tied to its aggregate international collateral (or liquidity), and therefore
external crises occur when this external constraint binds. This paper studies the use of
sterilization as a tool for international liquidity management. Since sterilization is effec-
tively an intervention in domestic assets markets, an adequate treatment of this liquidity
management issue requires us to be explicit not only about the presence of an aggregate
external constraint, but also about the structure of domestic assets and their liquidity.
For a concrete example of the environment and policy issues addressed in thispaper,
consider the following: Suppose, that all domestic production in the economy requires only
imported goods. In order to put up a building in downtown Bangkok, a Thai developer must
import all the raw materials for the building. Suppose that this building is not acceptable
collateral to a foreigner, so that loans to this developer, against the collateral of the building,
will only be forthcoming from other domestics. Lacking any internationally liquid assets
to exchange for the raw materials, it would appear that the real estate developer is in a
dilemma. However, suppose that foreigners do accept, as internationally liquid assets, claims
on export sector receivables. Then, construction can proceed as long as the real estate
developer can find a domestic with export sector revenue who will accept the building
3See Caballero and Krislmamurthy (1999) for a model of crises based on collateral shortages. Forus,
an internationally hquid asset is one that can be sold (or borrowed against) at a moment's notice to an
international investor without suffering a steep discounL A shortage of international liquidity means that
the quantity of these assets, net of any pre-existing external debt, is insufficient to meet all external financial
needs.
2as collateral. At the aggregate level, domestic investmentbuilding construction —is
constrained by the supply of internationally liquid assets. Will domesticagents adequately
assess the international liquidity value and costs of the assets and liabilities theygenerate
when making their investment decisions7 Following Caballero andKrishnamurthy (1999),
we show that the answer to this question is typically negative in an emerging market. That
is, too much international liquidity is sacrificed in the real estate boom.
Now snppose that the economy is currently in an investment boom in whichmany loans
are being made, there is much real estate development, and the economy is tradingaway
its international liquidity. Anticipating a shortage of international liquidity in the future,
the central bank tries to increase the international liquidity provisions of theeconomy by
offering public bonds in exchange for internationally liquid assets during the boom. The
sterilized intervention leaves the central bank with more international reserves whileleaving
the private sector with more public bonds. The direct effect of this transaction isjust a
reallocation of international liquidity from the private sector to the central bank. Does this
financial reorganization have any real effects? In particular, does the reallocation curtail
real estate investment today and have the desired effect of mitigating the future liquidity
shortage? Can the action ever backfire, as practitioners warn, leading to a further loss of
liquidity, and biasing capital inflows towards shorter maturities? We show in thispaper
that the answers to these questions depend on the explicit and implicit commitments of the
government, and on the degree of development of domestic financial markets.
A central finding is that the outcomes of sterilizationmay hinge on the liquidity of
secondary markets for government bonds. Sterilization can be very transaction intensive
and the large volumes can test the liquidity of secondary markets. If the government bonds
sold in sterilization are illiquid, there is a sort of "liquidity" mismatch that arises in the
central bank's balance sheet which can lead to an aggregate loss of liquidity and an expansion
rather than a contraction in aggregate demand or nontradeables investment.
The basic mechanism behind backfiring is similar to a "bailout" problem, although
it derives from financial market deficiencies rather than from moral hazard or government
ineptitude. For example, suppose that the government acquires international reserves today
and issues completely illiquid government bonds to the market. That is, the bonds are long
term and have no secondary market, so that they must be held until maturity. Now suppose
that the commitment of the government to supplying the reserves in the event of the crisis
is shortei in term —e.g., the government is expected to supply the reserves over the next
months and the bonds do not mature for a year. Then, by its action and commitment
the government has increased its support of domestic asset prices during downturns and,
contrary to its goal, effectively reduced the cost of capital for real estate builders.4 Real
4See Frankel (1997) for a discussion of different sterilizatiou models from the perspective of a model where
3estate builders take out loans at this low cost of capital to "arbitrage" the government's
short-term liquidity commitment. We show that this mismatch leads to increased external
borrowing and a shift in the composition of borrowing toward short maturities.5'6'7
Unlike the international finance literature, we emphasize the international liquidityman-
agement aspect of sterilization over its monetary aspect. Changes in international reserves
and public debt are central to our analysis. While not addressing sterilization, both Wood-
ford (1990)andllolmstrom and Tirole (1998) present models in which policy has real effects
through changes in public debt. Government policies are non-Ricardian because public debt
provides the private sector with liquid assets that they are unable to create for themselves.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) show that when there are aggregate shocks the private sector
may have a shortage of liquid assets. Public bonds make up this shortfall and government
policy has real effects. In our model, on the other hand, issuing public bonds does not
increase private liquidity. In fact we shall assume that if the government issue a public
bond, the private sector anticipates a tax liability which reduces domestic private liquidity
one for one. As a result, policy along the lines of Woodford (1990) or Flolmstrom and Tirole
(1998) will be Ricardian in our model. At a more abstract level, nonetheless, our policies
are related to theirs in that government policy acts through changing the liquidity of the
(in our case, international) assets ultimately held by the private sector.
In section 2 we lay out our basic model. We show that when domestic financial markets
are underdeveloped an externality arises whereby the private sector draws down its inter-
national liquidity too fast (over time) relative to the constrained efficient outcome. This
sets the stage for the policy discussion.
In section 3 we introduce a government/central bank and describe its rights and commit-
ments. We demonstrate conditions under which sterilization policy is effective and leads to
Pareto improvements and those under which it is completely undone by the private sector.
When domestic secondary markets are illiquid, the government action can backfire, leading
to a net loss of international liquidity and a Pareto loss.
In section 4 we show that our perspective naturally accommodates two additional sources
public bonds and corporate bonds are imperfect substitutes.
5With some relabeling, this mechanism can also be illustrated via a fixed exchange rate commitment.
Suppose that the government has reserves to sustain a fixed exchange rate over the next year, but has issued
bonds that expire later. Then capital inflows to purchase the bonds cannot take advantage of the fixed
exchange rate unless the bonds can be sold in liquid secondary market in the next year. If this is not so,
other shorter term assets willbecreated to take advantage of the govenment commitment. The domestic
private sector finds that there is good demand for such assets andtakesout loans (i.e. sells the asset) and
increases real investment.
6The shift in composition of capital inflows during periods of intensive sterilization has been documented
by, e.g., Montiel and Reinhart (1999) and Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993).
7Dooley (1999) has also emphasized some of the insurance aspects of interventions.
4of concern during sterilization episodes: the rise in the quasi-fiscal deficit and theshortening
of the maturity of capital flows. We show that when domestic secondary marketsare illiquid,
the former symptom may arise even when the sterilization fails to raisecorporate interest
rates. The latter symptom, on the other hand, stems from domestic agents' undervaluation
of the insurance aspect of long term debt, yet another manifestation of theexternality
highlighted in section 2.
Section 5 adds money and a lending channel. Withth the context of this expanded model
we supplement our results with the standard Mundell-Fleming insight that sterilization is
more likely to succeed when the central bank has no commitment to supply international
reserves at a pre-specified price. This advantage of a flexible exchange rate system is limited,
in that the core issues discussed in the previous section remain, and that the additionalsuc-
cess in sterilizing comes from implicit transfers rather than Pareto-improvements. Section
6 concludes and is followed by an appendix.
2 A Model of Crises and Illiquid Financial Markets
In this section we develop a simple open economy model where two forms of liquidity, do-
mestic and international, are required to fulfill investment plans. International liquidity
determines a firm's ability to borrow from international financiers. Domestic liquidity, on
the other hand, determines a firm's ability to borrow from domestic financiers. A claim on
a piece of land in Patagonia is a domestically liquid asset in Argentina, whereas the dollar
reserves backing the currency board or export sector receivables are counted as internation-
ally liquid assets. Shortages of either form of liquidity may lead to difficulties. We shall
focus on and describe an external crisis as a situation where, primarily, there is an aggregate
shortage of international liquidity. That is, the sum of the international liquidity of each
firm is less than that required to fulfill all investment plans. In this case, domestic liquidity
serves to allocate international liquidity to the highest value of use.
We set up a model to explain how these two forms of liquidity interact and arrive at
our main result of this section: in a dynamic context, when domestic liquidity is low agents
will undervalue holding international liquidity relative to the constrained efficient outcome.
Domestic liquidity is low when domestic financial markets are illiquid and underdeveloped.
Thus, we demonstrate the existence of P.areto improving policies in cases when domestic
financial markets are underdeveloped. In the next section we introduce a government and
study the effectiveness of sterilization in implementing Pareto gains.
While the incidence of crises in emerging economies certainly have to do with aggregate
shocks, in the model that follows we suppress them in order to highlight the essence o our
mechanism. We show that under certain conditions the decentralized economy will fully
5anticipate a crisis, and still will not do enough about it.5
2.1 The Economic Environment, Assets, and Balance Sheets
2.1.1 Basic setup
Time.The world lasts three periods. Time is indexed as t =0,1,2. Date 0 is the
fully flexible period when agents design the productive structure, ownership structure, and
portfolio allocations. Date 1 is the crisis period, when agents must shift resources from the
future to cope with shocks in the present. Date 2 represents the unconstrained future, when
the economy is (relatively) rich in resources.
Agents and heterogeneity. There are two types of agents: (i) a continuum of unit measure
of domestic entrepreneurs-consumers (henceforth, domestics) with linear preferences over
date 2 consumption of a single good, and (ii) foreign financiers (henceforth, foreigners)
with large endowments at all dates and linear preferences with no discounting, thus the
international gross interest rate is one.9
Endowment, Production, Investment, and Liquidity. We assume that domestic agents are
endowed at date 0 with w units of an internationally liquid asset —e.g.,the preseut value
of export sector receivables —andaccess to a production technology.
On net, domestic agents must import materials from the rest of the world in order to
produce. They do this by pledging their international liquidity to foreigners and taking on
foreign debt of d0,1. Production has a time-to-build aspect. Investments are made at dates
oand1, and output is realized at date 2. Let k denote the total amount of capital devoted
to production at the beginning of date 1, inherited from date 0. Then creating capital of Ic
requires a date 0 investment of c(k) units of imported goods. c(k) is assumed to be strictly
increasing, convex and positive.
We capture the normal churn of the economy, with its implied domestic heterogeneity,
with a simple Bernoulli process. At date 1, half of the firms are spared of further investment
and go on to produce Rk units of goods at date 2. The rest experiences a productivity fall,
A R —r> 0, which can be offset by reinvesting a fraction 01 of k, in units of the
imported good, in order to realize output at date 2 of:
R(9)k=(r-4-0A)k<Rk.
This time-to-build structure underlines a critical link between financing and production
during a crisis. Firms in any economy have ongoing capital needs (working capital, etc.).
5See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999) for a similar model with aggregate shocks.
9The distinction between foreigners and domestics needs not be as stark as posited here. Domestic
savers, for example, may be grouped with one or the other depending on the nature of the shocks faced by
the economy Our insights can be easily extended to more complex environments along this direction.
6Starving firms of capital has the effect of shutting down production units in apotentially
wasteful manner —toanticipate results, this is our crisis The dual of this shutting down
of production units is that the marginal value of capital duringa crisis is very high.
The timeline is given below.
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Figure 1: Time Line
In order to explore the financial problems that concern us, we make assumptions to rule
out key insurance contracts, and to allow for a borrowing constraint that limits a distressed
firm to take on debt with promised repayments of less than rk.'0 We shall return to these
assumptions shortly
Assumption 1 (Non-observability of Production Shock)
The production shock at date 1 is idiosyncratic. The identity of firms receiving the shock is
private information.
Assumption 2 (Domestic Borrowing Constraint)
A domestic lender can only be sure that a finn will produce rk units of goods at date 2.
Any excess production based on physical reinvestment at date I is neither observable nor
verifiable
There are two types of assets in this economy, those that are domestically liquid and
those that are internationally liquid. rk is domestically liquid in that it can be pledged to
'°Since the production shock is not observed, even intact firms that do not receive the shock have borrowing
capacity of only rk. Of course, only the distressed firms need to raise funds, so the borrowing constraint on
the intact firm never binds
7another domestic in order to take on debt. On the other hand, weassume that rk cannot
be pledged to a foreign investor. Foreigners only lend to a firm against its internationally
liquid assets of w. This means that the maximum amount of external debt thecountry can
take on is w.11 While much of this asymmetry can have a microeconomicorigin, there are
sovereign aspects that reinforce it. We return to this issue in the next section.
Assumption 3 (Liquidity Bias)
Foreigners lend to domestic firms only against the backing of w. Domestics lend against
bothw andrk.
Financial structure and Balance Sheets. Firms can raise finance at date U and date 1 from
either domestic or foreign investors. We assume that all finance must be default free and
fully secured debt —eitherby domestic liquidity in the case of domestics, or international
liquidity in the case of foreign investors.
Date 0 decisions result in firms arriving at date 1 with installed capital of k and foreign
debt of dof. At date 1, a firm that receives a shock is distressed (S), while a firm that
escapes the shock is intact (I). The balance sheet of a domestic firm has assets of v/c units
of domestic liquidity and w units of international liquidity, and foreign debt ofdos. The
simplest way to think of the asymmetric treatment of collateral by foreigners and domestics,
is to think of foreigners studying a balance sheet of the firm as perceiving only w as assets.
On the other hand, a domestic sees both this quantity as well as rk as assets. Thus the
debt constraint with respect to foreigners at date 0 is,
dof<w.
At date 1, if a firm takes on additional debt with foreigners, the date 1 debt constraint is:
d0,1 + dl,fW.
2.1.2Discussion of main assumptions
Let us pause at this juncture and discuss our main assumptions, starting from the two
borrowing constraints.
We have assumed a friction that prevents a domestic entrepreneur from borrowing fully
up to his output from another domestic. Investment at date 0 produces v/c goods at date 2,
and depending on the realization of shocks and rinvestment, an additional A/c ofoutput.
'1The stark distinction between domestics and foreigners in their valuation of assets isonly made for
simplicity. in reality, many residents behave like our foreigners at time of distress (e.g., households may
be behind capital flights), and many foreigners behave hke our domestics (e.g., institutional specialists vell
informed and connected with the domestic establishment).
8In a well functionthg domestic financial market —i.e.if there wete no frictions in borrowing
from another domestic —boththe i-k and the Ak of output could be sold to obtain funds
for investment. In assuming that only the output of i-k is observable andverifiable, we
have restricted claims sold to another domestic to i-k. The modeling of thisborrowing
constraint is not unusual. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) follow a similaravenue by assuming
that output is not verifiable, but that physical collateral (land) is. Our i-k is akinto their
collateral. Flolmstrom and Tirole (1998) develop a model with an ex-ante unobserved effort
choice where a fraction of output has to be paid as a rent to theentrepreneur so that he
exerts effort. While our model does not have ex-ante moral hazard, it shares the feature
that a fraction of output (i.e. Ak) can never be promised to a lender. Indeed,any model
with borrowing constraints will share the feature that some fraction of futureoutput is
unpledgeable. As we will see, this gives rise to some standard features: the amount of
investment at date 1 will depend on the liquidity of firms at date 1, firnis will value holding
liquidity from date 0 to date 1.
When we say that the the domestic financial market is underdeveloped we are referring
to the fact that Ak cannot be borrowed against. In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999),
we introduce a parameter, A, that varies the amount of the extra Ak that can be borrowed
against. Thus we arrive at comparative statics on the degree of development of domestic
financial markets by relaxing the borrowing constraint In this paper we simply assume
that A =0,so that only i-k can be borrowed against.
While the modeling of the domestic borrowing constraint is not unusual, the asymmetry
in the borrowing constraint between domestics and foreigners is non-standard. i-k cannot
be borrowed against from foreigners, while it can from domestics. First of all, there is
empirical support for this assumption. For example, Mexico, during the 94-95 crisis, used
its oil revenues as collateral to back the liquidity package that it received. Inmany instances
the bias is directly justified by mandates on foreign institutional investors (e.g. limits on
real estate investments, see Blommestein, 1997)1213 Theoretically, the assumption is most
similar to that of the that of the sovereign debt literature wherein the assumption is typically
1201coursethere are important exceptions (e.g. 'too big to fail" utilities), but see, e.g., Kang and Stulz
(1997) for systematic Japanese evidence showing that, for small firms, those that are export oriented are
favored by foreign investors. See, e.g. Blomme.stein (1997), for a discussion of how real estate and other
assets considered highly illiquid or exposed to exchange risk are generally avoided (sometimes by mandate)
by foreign institutional investors. Interestingly, the very few exceptions to the sovereignty principle, by
which the rating on debt issued by a country's corporate sector is bounded from above by that country's
government debt rating, are for companies which belong to the export sector.
'3The September 1998 report on the Asian crisis by the World Bank, describes firms that borrow in
foreign currency as "predominantly large exporting firms with ties to foreign companies, and they have
better adjusted to the crisis..." (box 4.3, page 62). The 1997 Industrial Survey in Thailand reflected that
of those firms that borrow in foreign currency, 88 percent export, have an average of 818 employees, a debt-
equity ratio of 3.12, a relatively high capacity utilization and optimism during the crisis, 70 and 37 percent
9that only a fraction of exports or net exports is international collateral. On the otherhand,
the sovereign debt literature typically just imposes international collateralas an aggregate
constraint. We take a microeconomic perspective by assuming that w is held by individual
agents in the economy who can trade it among themselves and with foreigners.
Sensible as it may be, here we have simply posited assumption 3 regarding liquidity
bias. In the next section we introduce a government and sovereign risk, therebyproviding
an alternative —and more explicitly modeled— grounding for the assumption.
The last assumption worth commenting on is the non-observability of the idiosyncratic
production shock at date 1. Domestic agents are ex-ante identical at date 0. If thepro-
duction shock was verifiable, domestic agents would write contracts amongst themselves to
insure that they would be ex-post identical as well. There would be no heterogeneity at
date 1 amongst domestics and frictions in the domestic market would have no economic
effect. Assuming non-obser'ability is necessary to study the impact of these frictions.
2.2 The Microeconomjc Problem
Domestics have two sets of decisions. At date 1, given the date 0 choices of other firms
(through prices) and the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, a domestic firm must decide
how much to borrow (lend) and reinvest. At date 0, a firm must decide how much to
invest and how much international liquidity to retain. We solve this problem by backward
induction, starting from date 1.
Date 1 problem.Consider the problem of a distressed firm in raising funds to alleviate its
production shock. A choice of Ok will result in output at date 2 of R(O)k goods. In order to
save a fraction 0 of the distressed unit, the firm must raise finance and reinvest Bk import
goods. It can do this in two ways. First, the firm may have some international liquidity at
date 1 that it can use to borrow directly from foreigners. That is the firm can always raise
directly,
dl,f c—
Thelatter quantity is always positive, and represents the minimum that a firm can raise at
date 1. The rest must come from intact firms, which also have access to foreign investors
since their capacity to borrow abroad at date 1 is also w —dof.
A distressed firm can use its domestic liquidity to access the international liquidity of the
intact firms. In equilibrium, the 12-tter discount the domestic liquidity at a rate of L1 ￿ 1
in providing international liquidity. L1 is the date I interest rate. It is not an interest rate
that is driven by expectations of default or currency depreciation. Rather, it is driven by
respectively. The same statistics for firms that do not borrow in foreign currency (75 percent of firms) are:
46 percent, 139 employees, 2.36, 61 percent and 19 percent. See Dollar and Hallward-Dreimeier (1998).
10liquidity considerations. L1 is strictly greater than one only when the country is "illiquid,"
in the sense that its aggregate availability of international liquidity is less than itsneeds
(see below).'4 For this reason,we refer to L1 —1as the international liquidity premium.15
Through this "credit chain" —which represents the domestic financial markets in our
framework— the distressed firm is able to aggregate the international liquidity of theecon-
omy and pledge this to foreigners to raise resources for date 1 reinvestment. Let d,1 and
di,d represent the foreign and domestic debt contracted by a distressed firm at date 1,
respectively. We can then write the problem of a distressed firm as,
(P1)V3maxo,dlfald w + R(0)k — — dl,f—did





Constraints (i) and (ii) are balance sheet constraints (net marketable assets greater
than liabilities), while constraint (iii) reflects that new investment must be fully paid with
the resources received by the firm at date 1 in taking on debts of d,j and did. Constraint
(iv) is purely technological.
An intact firm at date 1 has only one decision: how much finance will it extend to the
distressed firm. Suppose that the firm accepts claims at date 1 ofx1,d (face value of date
2 goods) in return for making a date 1 contribution of xld/Li which is financed with new
external debt d71. Then,
(P2)14maxin + Bk + x,d —d0j
—df
s.t. do,f -4- df in
11d— js L —"if
Date 0 problem.At date 0, a firm looking forward to date 1 can expect to find itself as
either distressed or intact. Thus the decision at date 0 is,
(PS) rnaxk,d(V + V,)/2
st.
c(k) =do,f.
'4Allen and Gale (1994) also develop a liquiuity based model of asset prices, in which prices may be based
on "cash in the market" rather than fundamentals. Similarly, in our model, hen the country is illiquid
interest rates are partly driven by the supply of international liquidity.
15WhiIe it can be represented as a shift in the interest parity condition, it is important to realize that it
is domestic suppliers of international liquidity, rather than foreigners, who earn the liquidity premium.
112.3 Equilibrium and Crises
Equilibrium.Market clearing in the domestic debt market at date 1 (capital letters
denote aggregate quantities) requires that the aggregate amount of domestic debt takenon





determines the gross interest rate, Li. --
Anequilibrium of this economy consists of date 0 and date 1 decisions, (k, dof) and
(0, d1,1, did, Xi,d), respectively, and prices L1.16 Decisions are solutions to the firms' prob-
lems (P1), (P2), and (PS) given prices. At these prices, the market clearing condition (1)
holds
Let us now study equilibrium in more detail. Starting from date 1, consider financing
and investment choices of the distressed firm given (k, def). First, if A ￿ 1, then the
distressed firm would choose to save as many of its production units as it can. It may
borrow up to its international debt capacity,
=w—d0. (2)
If the amount raised from international investors, w —doj,is less than the funds needed
for restructuring, k, the firm will have to access the domestic debt market to makeup the
shortfall. It will choose to do this as long as A ￿ L1, or the return on restructuring exceeds
the interest rate. If the firm borrows fully up to its domestic debt capacity, it will issue
debt totalling,
dl,d =rk, (3)
and raise funds with which to pay for imported goods ofAs long as the sum of? and
the right hand side of (2) is more than the borrowing need, the firm is unconstrained in its
reinvestment at date 1 and all production units will be saved. In this case, the firm will
borrow less than its domestic debt capacity (and perhaps less than the international debt
capacity).
Intact firms can tender at most their excess international debt capacity of w —dofin
return for purchasing domestic debt. They will choose to do this as long as the domestic
interest rate exceeds the international rate of one, L1 ￿ 1.
16Where we have used the fact that at equilibrium prices,=df.
12Assume for a moment that A ￿ L, ￿ 1 so that distressed firms borrowas much as they
can, and intact firms lend as much as they can. Then, in total the economy can import
w dO,f goods, which is directed to the distressed firms. A necessary condition for all
production units to be saved is that,
<w—dof. (4)
We shall refer to this constraint as the international liquidity constraint When neither
(3) nor (4) binds, all production units are saved. Since there is excess supply of funds
from intact firms relative to domestic demand for funds, there is no international liquidity
premium, and L1 is equal to the international interest rate (one).
The other extreme case is when both (3) and (4) bind. Equilibrium in the domestic
debt market requires that,
v/c
=w—dD,f.
Since (3) binds, distressed firms borrow fully up to their debt capacity. As (4) binds, intact
firms purchase this debt with all of their excess funds. Solving for L1, yields
v/c>1. (5) w —dof
That is, in this case the international liquidity premium is positive. L1 is above the
(gross) international interest rate in order to clear the domestic market for scarce interna-
tional liquidity. One half times the numerator in (5) corresponds to the transferable do-
mestic resources owned by distressed firms. The international liquidity premium is positive
when these resources are greater than one half times the denominator, which corresponds
to the excess international liquidity owned by intact firms.
Define the index of domestic ii liquidity as the difference between the marginal profit of
saving a distressed production unit and the domestic interest rate of L,. When (4) binds,
this is simply,
Sd= A
Equilibrium at date 1 can place the economy in one of four regions, classified according
to which of the two (domestic and international) liquidity constraints are binding. These
regions are summarized in the appendix.'7 In the main text we focus on a crisis scenario,
'7Depending on the date 0 choices of k and v. —dof(see the appendix) aay of four regions are possible.
Date 0 decisions then pin down these choices and tell us which region will prevail at date 1. A property
of the model is that, depending on parameter values, any of the four regions are equilibrium outcomes of
the model. This is largely due to the fact that model is one of certainty -agentsat date 0 know exactly
which of the four regions will prevail at date 1. in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1909), the model includes
aggregate uncertainty (essentially in w), so that the occurrence of any particular region is a surprise and at
date 0 agents face a date 1 world where these regions are blended.
13where both liquidity constraints are binding. At the aggregate level, theeconomy is liquidity
constrained with respect to foreigners; at the individual level, firms are liquidityconstrained
with respect to other domestics since they are selling all of their domesticliquidity in
aggregation; real investment is constrained; domestic spreads are positive; and the interest
rate of Li is above the international interest rate. This is the most interestingconfiguration
for the prevention-policy questions we intend to address in the main section of thepaper.
Technical Assumption 1 (Conditions for Crisis)
Assume that:
The assumption guarantees that in equilibrium A > L1 > 1 and 0 < 1. Thisensures
focus on a case where botli (3) and (4) bind.
Proposition 1 (Crisis Region)
Under assumption 1, date 0 decisions of k and clef are such that both the international
constraint and the domestic constraint are binding. The international liquidity premium and
the domestic illiquidity index are positive, and some projects are downsized. L1 > 1,5d>
0,0<1.
Graphically, the solution to (P3) is represented in figure 2. The inner curve represents













Figure 2: (P3)is satisfied with equality. The tangent line reflects the tradeoff betweenholding domestic
and international liquidity. Its slope is given as — sothat higher values of L1 make
the line flatter.
In order to arrive at the crisis region, point A needs to lie between the tworays. This
is the area where, k >w—do,f, butk <w —d01.
2.4 Constrained Inefficiency
When the economy is in the crisis-region it is international liquidity thatpresents the domi-
nant bottleneck. Domestic liquidity, on the other hand, determines the allocation of surplus
during these crises. We show next that when there is insufficient domestic liquidity, the
market surplus allocation will not correspond to that of the central planner. Inparticular,
the central planner will desire to allocate all the surplus to the liquidity suppliers. This
will generally not happen when domestic liquidity is low as those in need have insufficent
commitment to compensate the international liquidity providers adequately.
Proposition 2 (Underprovision of International Liquidity) When both liquidity con-
straints are binding at date 1, the decentralized equilibrium is constrained inefficient. A
central planner can effect a Pareto improvement by fon3ing the private sector to decrease
(Ic., dof), thereby increasing the international liquidity of the economy. The welfare gain
from this intervention rises with the index of domestic illiquidity, 8d
Proof:First let us rewrite (P3), substituting in the value function from (P1) and (P2). A
date 0 choice of (Ic, do,f) result in date 2 resources (net of any contracted debt) of,
(w —doñA+
if the firm is distressed. This is because (w —dof)is direcly pledged to foreigners, and the
proceeds invested at the project return of A. The rk of domestic liquidity is sold at the
interest rate of Li, and the proceeds invested at A. If the firm is intact, date 2 resources
are,
(w —dc,j)Li+ Rk.
Thus the date 0 program is,
(P4) maxk,f (1? +rj)k + (A + Li)(w —doj)
s.t. u
c(k) =dof
Consider the program for a central planner who directly chooses (Ic, dof) to maximize
the equally weighted sum of utilities of agents in this economy. To do this we simply
15substitute the expression for L1, (5), into the objective of (P4), arriving atan expression
that is free of prices. The program for a central planner is,
(PS) maxKD01 (R + r)K + 2A(W —Dof)
&t. w ￿
c(K) =
The solutions to (PS) are the constrained efficient decisions of theeconomy. The only
difference between the programs (P4) and (P5) is in the objective. Subtracting the objective
in (P5) from that of (P4) we arrive at,
Sd(fK(W_Dof)).
At a given equilibrium, this term must be zero. But it is apparent that individuals and
the central planner value a marginal unit of international liquidity and domestic liquidity
quite differently. Moreover, this misvaluation is directly proportional to 8d,thedomestic
illiquidity index.
The first order condition of (PS) gives,
while that of (P4) yields,
c'(K) =R+r2'
c'(k) =




Figure3: (P4) and (PS)The two tangent lines reflect the tradeoff between retaining liquidity andmaking phys-
ical investments. The steeper of the two (the solid line)represents the objective in (P4),
the decentralized case. On the other hand, the dashed line is the objective in thecentral
planner's problem. From the point of view of retaining liquidity, the central planner is only
concerned with protecting international liquidity. This is because internationalliquidity is
all that can be used to attract foreign investment. However at the microeconomic(decen-
tralized) level, both domestic and international liquidity can be used to secure financing.
This is the basic tension between the individual and the central planner's problem.
The solutions to the programs are points A and B in figure 3. It is clear that the
central planner will prefer to retain more international liquidity than individual firms when
8d > 0.18 In other words, a central planner must find a mechanism to induce the private
sector to reduce k.
In sum, financial constraints create a wedge between internal and external returns.
When rk is small, distressed firms are borrowing constrained. This creates a spread between
the internal rate of return for such a firm (A) and the rate of return that can be credibly
promised to outside domestic financiers (L1). The domestic spread of A —L1is just the
dual of an inefficient domestic capital allocation process. Indeed if firms could pledge all
of A to a financier the borrowing constraint would never bind and 8d would be equal to
zero. In a dynamic setting, the domestic spread leads to an undervaluation of international
liquidity. Since at the date 1 crisis there is a shortage of international liquidity, abating
it requires an ex-ante decision to carry an extra unit of international liquidity into date 1.
However, doing so provides the holder less than the full social return on this liquidity —in
fact, the shortfall is proportional to the domestic spread. Anticipation of this reduces the
private sector's incentive to accmnulate and provision international liquidity.
3 The Government, Asset Liquidity, and Sterilization Policy
Having set the stage for policy intervention, we can now consider whether sterilization policy
is likely to succeed in offsetting the expansionary consequences of capital inflows.
In a sterilization, the central bank sells public bonds to domestics in order to reabsorb
the monetary expansion brought about by capital inflows. A capital inflow plus steriliza-
tion leaves the central bank with more international reserves as assets, and more domestic
government bonds as'liabilities. Thus, in reduced form, the central bank sells bonds for
international reserves. In our language, this corresponds to a swap of domestic liquidity for
18111 Caballero and Krishnarnurthy (1999) we show that when all date 2 output can be pledged to another
domestic —thatis, both rk as well as k, —thenSd= 0and there is no externality conducive to overborrowing
and overinvestment. Hence intervention is only justified when domestic financial markets are undeveloped.
17some of the international liquidity held by the private sector (which needs to borrow abroad
to buy the public bonds).
Widespread as it may be, sterilization is perceived as a "risky" strategy, hampered by
the possible overreaction of the private sector. Bnt the mechanisms behind this "risk"are
not well understood, let alone modeled. In this section we offer a methodic analysis of
sterilization in an economy with underdeveloped financial markets for private and public
instruments. We shall begin by noting conditions under which the private sector completely
undoes the central bank's action. In cases where this does not occur, we demonstrate
conditions under which the policy can be Pareto improving, and those under which it
results in a Pareto loss. Before doing so, however, we must introduce the (consolidated)




We consolidate the central bank and the treasury. The minimum number of ingredients we
need in order to address our policy question is one public financial instrument and a tax to
finance any quasi-fiscal deficit that the sterilization pohcy may generate.i9 We start with
this minimum and enrich the set of public financial instruments to include money in section
4, when we discuss exchange rate systems.
We formally describe public bonds in the next assumption, and justify it at the end of
the preliminaries-section, when we discuss the key assumptions of this section.
Assumption 4 (Public Bonds)
At date 0, the government issues public bonds with face value B:
• (Long Maturity) These bonds mature at date 2, but can be bought and sold in secondary
markets at date 1.
• (Illiquidity) A sale at date 1 of one unit of a date 2 government bond suffers a real
cost of 0 < a < 1. Selling X units of bonds only recovers X(—a) units of international
liquidity.
19lmportantly taxes are always paid in units of liquidity (either domestic or international). That is,
suppose that a firm has rk units of domestic liquidity at date 1, and that the government levies a tax of T
on the firm. Then, after the transaction the firm will be left with rk —¶1units of domestic liquidity, and the
government will be left with T units of domestic liquidity. Thus, if the firm has a tax liability of T to the
government, this simply reduces its liquidity with respect to other firnis That is, unlike Woodford(1990)
and Holrnstrorn and Tirole (1998), our government cannot create liquidity The simplest way to think of
taxes is that they alter the balance sheet of a firm by introducing an additional liability This then affects
the finn's ability to raise finance from other agents.
183.1.2 Sovereign Risk and Short Horizons
Aside from having the ability to issue public bonds and finance interestpayments with
taxes, the government can also disrupt the chain of payments connecting the domestic
private sector and foreign investors, thereby selectively defaulting on foreigners.
Assumption 5 (Sovereign Risk)
The government suspends convertibility at date 1 and imposes two restrictionson exchange:
• Foreigners are prevented from transporting any date 2 goods from within theeconomy
across the border.
• Any international liquidity holdings of the government/central bank are released to the
private sector only on presentation of an invoice for imported goods.
Short Horizons.At date 1 the government will suspend convertibility and repudiateany
date 2 claims directly owed to foreigners. Foreigners holding claims directlyon export sector
revenues (w) are unaffected by suspension, since they can seize these receivables directly.
However a foreigner holding a claim on a domestic firm or a domestic government bond has
only one choice. He must sell these claims to a domestic agent who has some international
liquidity and exit. That is domestic claims are internationally liquid only to the extent that
they can be exchanged for the private sector's international liquidity at date 1.
Lemma 1 (Foreigner's Short Horizon)
Foreigners have short horizons with respect to domestic claims. Any domestic claim acquired
at date 0 will always be sold at date 1. Claims on international liquidity are free of this
short horizon.
3.1.3 Discussion of assumptions
It is widely understood that absent the monetary channel, if domestics assets areper-
fect substitutes for international assets (or foreign reserves) sterilization must fail (seee.g.
Mundell (1962)). The reasoning is often applied to fixed exchange rate systems where
capital flows in to arbitrage any interest differential between domestic and foreign assets,
rendering monetary policy useless. Our model must also contend with this logic, though
for our purpose the argument is best restated in terms of international liquk!ity. Since
in sterilization the central bank removes international liquidity from the private sector in
exchange for domestic bonds, if foreigners view these bonds as perfect substitutes for the
subtracted liquidity, sterilization must fail.
It is easy to see in this context that if public bonds were one period, the reserves that the
government acquires in the sterilization would exactly repay the public bonds and the date
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213.3 Sterilization with Liquid Public Debt Markets
Let us start our study of the effectiveness of sterilization in a context whereprivate asset
markets are underdeveloped but secondary public debt markets are domesticallyliquid
(an0).
Lemma 2 (Date 0 Interest Rates)
If the private sector holds government bonds in equilibrium, the date 0 interest rate must
satisfy,
L0 ￿ L1
This is easy to verify. In order for domestics to hold government bonds, they mnst be
compensated for losing their international liquidity. Taking on an extra unit of debt costs
A + L1. However purchasing one bond yields an extra L0 AtL1 This gives us the inequality
in the lemma.
Sterilization is naturally associated with a capital inflow, as either foreigners or domestic
investors will attempt to buy the high yield government bonds. Foreigners have short
horizons, however. Thus, if foreigners see a scenario where they can purchase these bonds
at date 0 and sell them back to the domestic private sector at date 1, they will step in
to purchase the bonds. They will do this only to the extent that the private sector has
some international liquidity to offer at date 1. Thus the international liquidity of the public
bonds is closely tied to the international liquidity of the private sector. The other potential
buyer of the bonds is the domestic private sector itself. Since this sector does not have
short horizons, it can always take advantage of the high return on the bonds by borrowing
abroad (a capital inflow) to purchase the public bonds. However, once again, the capacity
of the private sector to do so is limited by its international liquidity. In both cases it is the
liquidity of the private sector that determines the outcome of sterilization.
3.3.1 Liquidity Conservation
Lemma 3 (Liquidity Bias and Aggregate International Illiquidity)
If the government sterilizes so that the private sector is internationally illiquid, dof =
thenforeigners will hold no domestic claims and restrict their holdings to international
claims.
Proof: see appendix.
This is the date 0 effect of future suspension of convertibility and market illiquidity. If
the domestic private sector has no international liquidity to offer a foreigner when he sells
domestic claims at date 1, then the foreigner's date 1 liquidity bias extends back to date
0. The foreigner anticipates that there will be a suspension of convertibility at date 1 and
22that there will be no buyers of his domestic claims. Thismeans he restricts his holdings of
domestic claims at date 0. The foreigner only hold direct claimson international liquidity
that are free of suspension of convertibility.
Proposition 3 (Liquidity Conservation)
Take the case where dof <w.Let (k',d1,L) be equilibrium choices and prices to (P6)
and (7,1 when B =0and let (k, d01, b, L1) be equilibrium choices and prices to (P6) and(7)





The proposition is fairly intuitive. When d0,1 <w,foreigners are willing to hold the
bonds at date 0. Moreover since the private sector is not internationally liquiditycon-
strained, it can always borrow from foreigners to purchase the bonds that the government
offers. Thus the gain in reserves of the government are offset one-for-one witha loss in
international liquidity of the private sector —either at date 0 if the private sector purchases
the bonds, or at date 1 if foreigners purchase the bonds— and the sterilization is completely
undone:
3.3.2 Pareto Improving Policy
Proposition 4 (Liquidity Contraction) There exists a sterilization policy of B >0such
that the resulting equilibrium of (Ic, do j,b, Li) is Pareto superior to (k',d,LI), as longas,
in the resulting equilibrium, dof =w.Optimal intervention raises the date 0 interest rate
relative to date 1. L0 >L1,while lowering the date 1 interest rate relative to the case of
no-intervention, L1 <Li.
Proof: As we showed in proposition 2, the decentralized equilibrium is constrained ineffi-
cient. Optimal policy should move the economy from point A to point B on figure 3. That
is to say, optimal policy should reduce date 0 investment so that Ic cIc'.
Suppose that the central bank offers B bonds at L0. The program for a firm choosing
to purchase b bonds is,
maxk,dQf,b(w —d01)(A k(R -1-re) +(b —T)(1+
s.t.do,jw
c(k) + =do,f.
23LFrom the previous proposition, we know that sterilization is ineffective if dof <to.
Takingthe other case (dof =to), wecan rewrite the program as,
maxi1j,k(R -i-r-&) -1- (b —T)(l+
s.t.e(k) + =to.
Thefirst order conditions for this program yield,
Loc'(k) =
1+ Li
Now optimal policy will be such that k < k'. For this to be thecase, we must have that
c'(k) < c'(k'). L0 satisfies,
iR+r — L1< c'(k') =
L0i+
Rewriting this yields
L0>L1 (8) ryr A + L1
Consider the market clearing condition for L1.
rK-f-B--T L1=L02B
which we can rewrite as,
B B Li—+Lj—=rK+B_T.
L0





If k < k' then=W—c(K)> W —D1.Therefore, L1 <L and B > 0. Combining
this with (8), we can conclude that> L1.22
21The budget constraint for the government is that,
T+L11B =B.
When L0 =L1,the budget balances without having to raise taxes. When, L0 > L1, it must be that T> U
to pay the interest on the government debt.
22We also need to make sure that A >L1after the intervention so that we are still in the region where
both liquidity constraints are binding.
iK < =A(W-c(K))
Since K C K', if the condition is satisfied at the decentralized solution, it must also be satisfied at the
central planner's solution.
24When the central bank offers bonds at a high interest rate (Lo >L1), there is clearly
a capital inflow to purchase the bonds. However, when the private sector isinternationally
illiquid (dDf =w), foreignersare unwilling to purchase the bonds since they recognize that
there will be no buyers for the bonds at date 1. Hence the only buyers of the bondsare
domestics. As long as domestics have reached their international debtcapacity, government
bonds cannot be purchased purely by borrowing abroad and saving.Expenditure must be
reduced as well, which is why k falls. This is the heart of intervention, byissuing domestic
bonds, the government crowds out private investment, while at the same time acquiring
all of the international liquidity of the private sector. It can then transfer this back to the
private sector at date 1. The government smooths shocks between date 0 and date 1. It
removes liquidity from the private sector at date 0 by raising interest rates, then it injects
this liquidity back into the markets at date 1, thereby lowering the cost of liquidity.
The main obstacle faced by the government in its attempt to reduce aggregate demand
(investment in k) at date 0 is the reaction of the private sector In a succesful sterilization
L1 falls both below L0 and below L. Remember that the private sector's incentives for
international liquidity provision are linked to L1. When L1 is low the private sector has
very little incentive to do so. Thus when the government intervenes, it actually reduces
the private sector's incentives for international liquidity provisioning. So much so that the
private sector chooses to sell all of its liquidity provisions and hold domestic government
bonds returning L0 > L1. As long as dDf =w thejob of liquidity provisioning is left fully
in the hands of the central bank.
The private sector anticipates a "bailout" and takes action. If the central bank is
committed to supplying liquidity at date 1 —in practice, via support of an exchange rate,
or via a government guarantee— the private sector will try to take full. advantage of this
support. First, the private sector will have no incentive to hedge (independently hold its
own international liquidity provisions.) Second, the private sector will attempt to undo the
liquidity provisioning of the government. They will borrow abroad paying the opportunity
cost of L1 and invest locally at the higher return of L0. When d0,1 < wthisaction by
the private sector fully offsets the liquidity provisioning by the central bank. Effectively,
the private sector appropriates any international reserves held in the central bank. When
dO,f =w theprivate sector reaches its international debt capacity and it must reduce
domestic expenditure in order to purchase government bonds.
3.4Sterilization with Illiquid Public Debt Markets: Policy "Mistakes"
Is liquidity provisioning by the central bank a policy mistake? The response of the private
sector, when viewed in isolation, would certainly suggest so. However, to appropriately
judge the policy one must view the private sector response in conjunction with the central
25bank action at both date U and date l
When sterilization is succesful, the private sector is not the marginal internationalliq-
uidity provider. The central bank takes over this job. Indeed, since L1 falls, the private
sector has little incentive to do so. Is it possible to arrive at scenario where both, L1 falls
so that the private sector has little incentive to liquidity provision, and the private sec-
tor remains the marginal liquidity provider? If so, the private sector would free-rideby
cutting its liquidity provisioning (relative to the case of no-intervention) and on net the
economy would lose international liquidity. In this section we show that this scenario is a
very real possibility when domestic markets are illiquid. We shall demonstrate conditions
under which the capital inflow accompanying sterilization leads not just toa pnrchase of
government bonds but also to increased lending to the domestic private sector.
At date 1, government bonds are exchanged for international liquidity by both domes-
tic distressed firms and any potential foreign investors. Distressed firms sell in order to
receive funds for investment, while foreign holders sell in order to exit the market. Wenow
reintroduce a friction in this transaction (a >0).
The illiquid secondary market makes it harder to liquidate the two periodgovernment
bond and exchange it for international liquidity 11ansactions costs must be paid, thereare
search costs involved in making the exchange, and potentially even rents must be paid to
market makers. This will further raise the required return for holding bonds at date 0, and
will increase the domestic illiquidity index, 8d,atdate 1.
3.4.1 Backfiring Policy
Suppose that the government sells bonds at date 0 in an attempt to sterilize, but does not
intervene sufficiently so that the private sector is still internationally liquid at date 0. B
government bonds are sold at interest rate of L0. Consider the program for a firm choosing
to hold b bonds at date 0,
(P7) maxk,d01, (w —do)(A4-L) + k(R + r-) + (b —T)(l4- (1—
s.t. dQ,fw
c(k) + =
Lemma4 (Government Interest Rates)
The date 0 interest rate on government bonds will always exceed the date I interest rate.
L0>L1
This lemma is easy to verify. Purchasing one government bond costsunits of inter-
national liquidity. At date 1, if the firm is distressed the bond can be sold for -j and the
proceeds invested to yield output at date 2 of A1. If the firm is not distressed, the bond
26is held till maturity to return one.23 The opportunity cost ofusing one unit of international
liquidity is to use it at date 1. If the firm is distressed, this yields A at date 2, while if the
firm is intact lending yields L1 at date 2. Thus firms purchase bondsas long as,
AILa + 1? (A + Li).
Rewriting,
aAL0 L0 ￿ L1 +
A + L1> L1.
Since government bonds are illiquid at date 1, they mustpay a high interest rate in
order to be held. Corporate borrowing rates on the other hand are determinedby L1, not
L0. If a firm was to sell some its domestic liquidity at date 0 and borrow (say, from another
domestic), it would pay the interest rate of L1. This is because another domestic would
value the lost international liquidity at the opportunity cost —thereturn to lending at date
1, which is L1.
Policy can backfire because sterilization leads to a fall in L1. When the government
sterilizes and holds international liquidity provisions, it commits to supplying these to the
market at date 1. If the bonds that the government issues are longer term and illiquid, these
liquidity provisions go toward supporting domestic private sector assets. The corporate
borrowing rate, Li, falls and corporates find it attractive to borrow and increase investment
at date 0.
To see why, consider an extreme case of illiquidity where the government bonds have no
secondary market and must be held till maturity (a =1).Market clearing at date 1 is as
follows: Distressed firms sell rK —T total of domestic liquidity at the date 1 interest rate of
L1, the B government bonds have no secondary market and must be held untill maturity.
Since one-half of firms are distressed, in total, firms raise for investment
rK-T
2L1
Now at the other side of the market are intact firms and the government. The government
has international liquidity of .,whileintact firms have in aggregate, W—D0,1Thusmarket
clearing is, rK-TW-D0jB
(9) 2L1 2
231t is also easy to check that foreigners wifi never purchase government bonds. The cost a is only suffered
if claims are liquidated at date 1. A foreigner has short horizons with respect to domestic claims. A domestic
has short horizons only if his firm is distressed. With probability one-half, the domestic holds the claim to
maturity and does not liquidate. Thus domestics have longer horizons and bear less of the illiquidity cost.
Which means that as long as domestic are holding government bonds, it must be that foreigners shy away
from holding them
27Rewriting this expression, yields
rK-T (B B\ (B B
'-'1\-'i00/ \'-'O / '—'1
The loss to the, government of intervening by issuing bonds at date 0 at tile high rate ofL0
and purchasing bonds at date 1 at the lower rate of L1 must be madeup in taxes. Thus,
rewrite this expression by substituting in, T =B—'B,as,
(10)
Now imagine that the private sector exactly offsets the government's reserve accumula-
tion. That is to say, suppose that for every unit that -y- rises, the prfvate sector takes on
an extra unit of date 0 debt. In this case, the term in the parentheses on the right hand
side would be unchanged by sterihzation. However if this is the case, and B > 0, it must
be that L1 fails, since the supply of liquidity to purchase private sector assets has risen by
This is why sterilization backfires. The government supports private sector assets and
hence lowers corporate borrowing costs.
The case where the government bonds are fully liquid highlights the key role played by
illiquid markets in the previous conclusion. Suppose that a =0,so that government bonds
can be sold at date 1 without any friction. In this case, distressed firms sell B bonds at the
price of L1 at date 1. Thus append -tothe left hand side of (10) to arrive at,
The government's reserves go towards purchasing back the bonds that it issued at date
0. Sterilization does not bring additional support for corporate assets, and hence L1 is
unaffected.
Let us now state this result more formally.
Proposition 5 (International Liquidity Loss)
Consider the case where a> 0. Let (W,d1,Lç) be equilibrium choices and prices to (P7)
and (9) whenB = 0and let (k, dof, b, L0, Li) be equilibrium choices and prices to (P7) and
(9)whenB> 0but do,f <w.Then,we have that,
L1 C
k >/c'
/ B > +
Proof:see appendix.
28An equivalent way to think about this result is in terms of capital inflows. When the
government sterilizes and commits to providing liquidity at date 1, foreigners come in to
purchase short term assets that will be supported by the government. If these assetsare the
government bonds that are issued in sterilization, then the sterilization is offset. However,
when the secondary market for government bonds is illiquid, foreigners willshy away from
holding these bonds and will instead demand other short term assets. The corporate sector
sees this as a borrowing opportunity on good terms and increases investment. Thus a
symptom of counterproductive sterilization is that corporate borrowing rates fall relative
to government borrowing rates. In other words, as B rises, the spread between the interest
rate on government bonds and that on corporate lending, L0 —L1rises.24
Backfiring is a policy mistake, but one that is not easy to avoid in the environment of
emerging markets. It occurs because the government does not sterilize enough —the private
sector is left with some international debt capacity that it borrows against on favorable
terms— and the domestic instruments that the government issues are illiquid. How much
sterilization is enough? In the model, the government has to sell enough bonds so that the
private sector reaches it international debt capacity (dof =vi). Thatis the government
takes all of the private sector's liquidity. This is clearly an abstraction. Our supply curve of
international funds is kinked at d0,1 =vi. Amore gradual slope would cause interest rates
to rise for smaller interventions. Indeed the key point is that in unsuccessful sterilizations,
corporate borrowing rates fall not rise, both absolutely and relative to government rates.
Nevertheless, during the booms when international capital markets ate all too willing to
lend to emerging economies, the amount of required sterilization is much higher and as such
the possibility that policy may backfire is very real. The second factor behind the failure of
sterilization, that of illiquid secondary markets, is more structural and seems unavoidable
in emerging markets.
3.5 Optimal Policy with Illiquid Secondary Markets
'Nhen there are illiquid secondary markets for government bonds, optimal policy must take
this into account. Are there always Pareto improving policies?• We answer this question
next.
24We have made the assmnption that the secondary market for corporate assets is liquid, while the
government asset market is illiquid. The assumption is clearly unrealistic, but our results depend on absolute
liquidity of the government market rather than the relative hquidity of the two markets. The reason is that,
ceteris paribus, when the government market is illiquid, sterilization leads to a liquidity mismatch in the
government's balance sheet. This means reserves will support private sector assets and lower, the absolute
cost of funds for the private sector -evenif this cost of funds before and after policy was above the government
bond interest rate. It is clearest to understand the backfiring result as sterilization causing a fall in the spread
between corporate assets and government bonds.
29Proposition 6 (Sterilization with Illiquid Markets) There exists a sterilization policy
of B > 0 such that the resulting equilibrium of (k,b, L0, Li) is Pareto superior to
as long as,
• (i) Domestic markets are sufficiently liquid (i.e small ).and
• (ii)In the resulting equilibrium. clof =to,so that the private sector is internationally
illiquid.
Optimal policy requires that, in equilibrium, the government raises date 0 interest rates,
L0 >L1,and the date I interest rate falls relative to no-intervention, L1 <L'1.
See the appendix for the proof. The result can be understood by studying figure 4. The
figure traces out welfare for the decentralized equilibrium as a function of k (U1T"), and
welfare for the equilibrium assuming that the central planner intervenes via sterilization,
and forces the economy to incur the secondary market illiquidity costs (U6).
- UCP,UPRIV
Figure4:U and UPR[V
Asin proposition 2, it is clear that the central planner values international liquidity
higher than the private sector, and domestic liquidity less. Thus the benefit of intervention
is that it moves the private sector away from a sub-optimal choice. That is, KCP .cK'.
However intervention has a cost, since firms must sell their bonds into an illiquid market.
Thus, it is clear that intervention always lowers the welfare function when a > 0.
Intervention is beneficial as long UCP(KCP) >.U(K'').But this depends on
the size of the externality versus the cost of intervention. The private sector always chooses




k = c'(w)to points on the lower curve. Thus if the cost is sufficiently high, point A lies belowpoint
C and intervention is not beneficial. On the other hand, in the extremecase where a =0,
UCP rises to UPRIV, so that point B is chosen by the centralplanner. It is always the case
that intervention is beneficial in this case.
4 Further Costs of Failed Sterilizations: Quasi-Fiscal Deficits
and Excessive Short Term Capital Inflows
In addition to fueling capital flows, sterilization often appreciates thecurrency, generates
quasi-fiscal deficits, and biases capital flows toward short term debt (e.g. Reinhart and
Reinhart (1998), Montiel and Reinhart (1997), and Calvo et al. (1993)). While each of
these regularities may just be the equilibriun counterpart of the higher domestic interest
rates associated with a successful sterilization, policymakers are often concerned that they
are too large or too severe to correspond to the simple counterpart of a successful policy.
We have already argued that failed sterilization leads to an increase in capital flows and
aggregate demand. In this section, we show that the backfiring result we described in section
3 also produces the quasi-fiscal deficit and the shortening in the maturity of capital flows.
Thus, these regularities may also correspond to symptoms of failed sterilization.
4.1 Quasi-Fiscal Deficits
Returning to the simple single-public financial instrument described in section 3, consider
the budget constraint of the government. This equates revenues, comprised of taxes and the
proceeds from selling the international reserves acquired during the sterilization episode, to
the face value of the bonds issued:
=B.
L0
There are many ways in which this constraint can lead to an increase in the fiscal deficit.
While when L0 =Li,the budget balances without having to raise taxes, when Lo > L1 it
must be that T> 0 to pay the high interest on the government debt. While this situation
arises with a successful sterilization (hence the high interest rates), it also does wheh there
is an illiquid secondary market for bonds.25 In lemma 4, we showed that when a > 0, it
25Quantitatively, it is seldom the case that the quas-fiscal costs associated with sterilization are much
larger than a quarter of a percent of GDP -asmall number when compared with other factors involved
in crises (see e.g. Kletzer and Spiegel (1998) who compute these costs for several Latin American and
Asian economies and conclude that they are not only small, but also draw little reaction from governments
and central banks). It is for this reason that we think of these costs as yet another dimension of a failed
sterilization, rather than as the primary source of concern.
31.must be that L0 >L1-Hence,atempting to sterilize in an illiquid bond market can have
large detrimental effects on the quasi-fiscal deficit, even without the rewards of a higher
domestic corporate borrowing rates and a slowdown in aggregate demand.
Needless to say, this deterioration in the fiscal situation can be worsened if thereserves
of international liquidity are not targeted back to the private sector in an efficient fashionat
date 1. This will occur if the government receives a return less than L1 on its international
reserves.
4.2 Excessive Short Term Capital Flows
The observed shortening in the maturity of capital flows following sterilization is particularly
interesting from our point of view. The step in arriving at this result from our model is
in defining short and long term debt in terms of their insurance features. One can think
of long term debt as short term debt plus rescheduling insurance. A simple extension of
the model presented h section 2 shows that agents undervalue the insurance component
of long term debt as long as L1 <A,which is the case when domestic financial markets
are underdeveloped. The result is akin to our previous result on the undervaluation of
international liquidity.
Suppose that only a fraction 1 —b,where 0 << 1,of w is directly pledgeable to
foreigners at date 1.26Debtthat is taken on against this 1— of international liquidity will
be viewed as short term debt. Now suppose that the rest, w, can be seized by foreigners
at date 2, however doing so requires payment of a monitoring cost of 0 <c-c (A —1)at
date 2. A domestic firm has two choices. (A) It can take on one period debtup to the limit
of (1 —)wat the international interest rate of one. Then at date 1, if it needs the funds,
it can roll this over and take on additional debt of bw. However, the interest rate on this
additional debt will obviously be above one to compensate the foreign lenders for bearing
the monitoring cost. (B) It can take on long term debt against the fullw, in which case
the foreign lenders will always pay the monitoring cost to seize the additional iw. Thus,
domestics face an upward sloping term structure of borrowing.
With option A, only firms that are distressed at date 1 will take on the additional debt
and draw down 1/'w. With option B, on the other hand, all firms will have pledged their
extra-collateral ex-ante, and the intact firms will sell the corresponding international funds
at date 1 to the distressed firms. The latter option is clearly socially preferable, since the
social value of an extra unit of liquidity is A —1>aThe problem, as before, is that
the return to intact firms is only L1 —1,which could well be below e if domestic financial
markets are illiquid. If this last inequality holds, the equilibrium is one where no firm values
26D.amond (1991) develops a model of debt maturity structure based on liquidity risk. The sketch of our
model is related but the maturity structures depeuds on aggregate liquidity risk.
32the insurance service of long term debt and is willing topay the high interest. This comes at
great cost in terms of the aggregate supply of international liquidity since a central planner
would prefer that firms take on the long term debt.
Since a failed sterilization lowers Li, the incentives for short versus long term debtare
adversely affected by it. Thus the capital inflow-composition problem is worsened when
there is backfiring.27
5 Intermediation, Exchange Rate Systems, and the Mundell-
Fleming Mechanism
Up to now, we have removed from our analysis any source of ex-ante heterogeneity among
domestics and made no distinction between domestic assets issued by the central bank
(money and bonds, in particular). In this section we go back to the basic model in section 2
but relax these two assumptions with the goal of connecting our framework to the traditional
Mundell-Fleming based discussion.
Introducing ex-ante heterogeneity gives a role to domestic asset markets at date 0, when
sterilization takes place. Money is an asset .with unique transaction services in these financial
markets. In particular, it facilitates bank lending. While none of our basic conclusions
are modified by these extensions, we find that indeed —and for more or less the standard
reasons— a flexible exchange rate system facilitates the success of sterilization. A monetary
contraction is indeed useful in limiting agents date 0 borrowing even before the private sector
runs out of international liquidity. However, in our lending-channel example, this additional
power is gained at the cost of losing the Pareto nature of the intervention, as it involves a
dynamic transfer from banks/savers to corporations.
5.1 Money and the Banking System
We introduce a minimalist structure to capture the special role of money in facilitating
domestic financial transactions at date 0. Rather than starting with homogeneous domestic
agents, we take the international wealth away from the corporate sector and allobate it
to a blended banking/savers sector (henceforth, referred to as bankers). Bankers, like
entrepreneurs, have linear preferences over date 2 consumption but have no investment
opportunities aside from lending to the corporate sector.
27Since a successful sterilization also lowers L1, the reader may wonder whether the shortening of capital
flows is also an implication of a successful sterilization. The answer to this question is that it will not. Since
government bonds yield L0 which is high, firms will find it profitable to borrow as much as they can at date
0, which will include both short and (expensive) long-term debt. That is, the high L0, replaces L1 in the
preceding cost-benefit tradeoff.
33In order to lend to the corporate sector at date 0, bankers require domestic collateral
from corporations and need to hoard p < 1 units of domesticmoney between dates 0 and
1 per unit of debt's face valne. They are born with M° units of high poweredmoney.
This means that the maximum amount of loans that the banking sector can make(to the
corporate sector) is also
The central bank fully backs up Mo with international reserves, which are exchange for
money at date 1. Thus, the nominal exchange rate at date 1, E1, is equal to one regardless
of the exchange rate system prevailing at date 0. Banks are not needed at date 1, so bankers
can participate directly in the financial markets without holding any money.
Taken together, these a.ssumptions create a transmission mechanism for domestic mon-
etary policy via the "lending channel."29 A central bank that contracts or expands M°/p
can affect the amonnt of lending from bankers to the corporate sector. Our assumptions
are designed to isolate the impact of this mechanism on the date 0 problem of taming the
boom, as it is apparent that at date 1 the Central Bank will attempt to ensure perfect
domestic aggregation of international collateral.
5.2 Monetary Policy in a Flexible Exchange Rate System
We remove bonds for now and fix M°, so monetary policy takes the form of a tightening in
reserve requirements, p. None of our main conclusions is affected by reintroducing bonds
and implementing the monetary contraction via open market operations instead (see below).





Let xe"denotethe potential demand for loans, defined as the demand that would arise if
=L1.Then the amount lent, X0, is:
=min[X6,XS/n] (12)
'8These steps can be disentangled more finely. For example, separating bankers from savers, the story
goes as follows: Banks face a reserve requirement on taking deposits from savers. Let p be the reserve
requirement. Then, given M° banks can only take in deposits of .Weadditionally assume that banks
cannot raise funds from savers in any other way than by taking deposits. This means that the maximum
amount of loans that the banking sector can make (to the corporate sector) is also °.Lastwe assume
that the rK of domestic liquidity that firms create is only tradeable among the corporate sector and banks.
That is loans to a firm with some domestic liquidity can only be made by other firms (for example, via asset
sales, trade credit, or mergers), or from savers through the banking sector.
29For discussion and evidence of the lending channel in the U.S., see for example, Kashyap, Stein and
Wilcox (1993).








while the rest of bankers' funds is supplied at date 1
x1=w—x0.
Itis apparent that by controlling j the central bank can manipulate the timing of
investment and hence aggregate liquidity provisions. It is here that exchange rate flexibility
plays a role, as it limits the private sector's mechanisms to undo the monetary squeeze.
It is important to notice, nonetheless, that unlike the policies we discussed in the previous
section, this mechanism relies on transfers as opposed to Pareto changes. In fact, since in
this section we have allocated all the wealth to a sector which has no real investment margin
(the bankers), the decentralized equilibrium is constrained efficient and p should be set to a
very low value. Reducing the fragility of the corporate sector by raising p comes primarily
at the expense of curtailing financial investment opportunities to bankers.
Furthermore, as in Mundell-Fleming, the counterpart of monetary control is that the
exchange rate at date 0, E0, is determined by the market. E0 must be such that banks are
indifferent between selling their stock of money at date 0 and collecting the return for the
funds that otherwise would have been involved in a loan package, and the return on the
loan itself:
L1+ i) =Lu+ L1p.
Solving for the exchange rate, yields:
Lip<1,
where s L0 —L1.While in our simplified framework such appreciation has no impact on
real allocations1 in reality it may be in itself a source of concern. For example, if bankers
had a choice on whether to consume an imported or a domestic good at date 0, some of
their international liquidity would be diverted to the early consumption of foreign goods.
301f X binds instead, L0 =L1.This case is uninteresting for us since monetary policy, of the type
discussed here, has obviously no effect on lending.
355.3 Monetary Policy in a Fixed Exchange Rate system
Suppose now that the exchange rate is fixed at one at date 0 as well, and the central bank
stands ready to swap international reserves for domesticmoney at the private sector's will.
There are two basic scenarios to consider in this fixed exchange ratesystem. In the
first one, foreigners do not value domestic money as collateral.31 It isapparent that in this
case bankers will offset any monetary contraction by selling their X1 to tile central bank in
exchange for domestic money. They will do so for as long as L0 > L1 and X1 > 0. Thus,
as in Mundell-Flemming, monetary policy is futile. This changes once Xj =0for then the
bailkers are constrained in the same sense as firms were in section 3 in the scenario where
sterilization worked. The "holy trinity" of open economy macroeconomics establishes that
only two out of the following three are possible: effectiveness of monetary policy, control
of the exchange rate, and free capital mobility. It is the endogenous canceling of the latter
that gives back its powers to monetary policy.32
The other limit case to consider is when high-power money is part of international col-
lateraL In that case, neither X0 nor X1 can be affected by monetary policy, thusmonetary
policy is useless. This case highlights an important aspect of the policy considerations we
have stressed throughout the paper: In order to be successful in preventing an external
crisis, the policymaker needs to be able to "hide" some of the private sector's interna-
tional liquidityat date 0. This, it will not be able to do if it attempts it be selling highly
internationally liquid instruments to its private sector.
6 Final Remarks
A central consideration of macroeconomic policy in emerging economies is external-crisis
prevention. In practice, the main macroeconomic tool utilized for such purpose is the
sterilization of capital inflows. However, existing models are not particularly well suited
to study this policy. On one hand, the sovereign debt literature identifies the aggregate
international constraint as limiting external debt repayments, and therefore links external
crises to this aggregate constraint. But as it is designed to answer a different question, this
literature suppresses domestic financial markets and is therefore unable to study outcomes of
sterilization policy. On the other hand, the Mundell-Fleming franiework directly addresses
sterilization policy. However, as it essentially ignores all aspects of the external financial
constraint and instead emphasizes the monetary aspect of sterilization, it is best suited
31Recall that bankers need to hold the money at date 0 in order to make the loans. Hence, thisassumption
does not mean that foreigners wouldn't accept money as a method of payment at date 0, but thatmoney in
banks' hands does not count as collateral.
32Reisen (1993) argues that the "holy trinity" does not apply when the central bank usesreserve require-
ments rather than open market operations. We do not find support for such claim in our model.
36to analyze policy in economies where international liquiditymanagement is not a central
issue —asituation that seems more apt for developed than developingeconomies, especially
in the neighborhood of external crises. Moreover, neitherapproach is explicit about the
degree of development of domestic financial markets and on how this affects theoutcome
of sterilization, a policy measure that relies heavily on these markets.
The framework proposed here roots both the need for policyas well as its outcomes in
the illiquidity or underdevelopment of a country's financial markets. Thecentral bank is
well aware of the external financial constraint and theconsequences of reaching it abruptly.
By sterilizing current capital inflows in an attempt to reduce aggregate demand, the central
bank not only changes its own and the private sector's portfoliosignificantly, but it also
invites the latter to reassess risks and respond to such measure. It is thisresponse which
represents the biggest obstacle to the success of policy. How risks change with the inter-
vention and how much the private sector does about it depend on the availability ofassets,
their liquidity, and the intervention rules of the central bank. All of these factorsare central
to our model.
When sterilization is successful, the private sector is not the marginal internationalliq-
uidity provider as the central bank takes over this job. Indeed, since the domestic cost of
capital at times of crises (Li) falls, the private sector has little incentive to do so. On the
other hand, when sterilization backfires L1 also falls, but in this case the private sector
remains the marginal liquidity provider. This outcome hinges on the liquidity of the public
debt market. One of the central features of the swap of bonds for internationalreserves
involved in a sterilization is the maturity mismatch that arises in the central bank's balance
sheet —internationalreserves (very short term) as assets and bonds (longer term) as lia-
bilities. This maturity mismatch, while largely irrelevant if the public debt market remains
liquid during crises, creates an "implicit insurance" to private claims if not, and hence it
effectively lowers the cost of capital to the private sector. This observation is relevant since
it is not uncommon to observe a decline in the spread between the private cost of capital
and the public bonds yield during sterilizations.33
The framework we have proposed and the issues we have analyzed raise at least as
many questions as they answer. In particular, since our model only has a corporate sector
and a central bank, international liquidity management is limited to studying central bank
33The case of Colombia during the early 903 one of the "classic" examples of steep sterilization in
Latin America— hints at the presence o' these mechanisms. While the interest rate onpublicbonds rose
sharply, the spread between private lending rates and public bonds' rates declined significantly (from around
seven percent previous to the 1991 sterilization to virtually zero during it), and the stock market soared.
On the expenditure side, while investment fell sharply, consumption only experienced a mild decline and
construction —as well as loans to it— kept rising. Of course, these facts must be interpreted with caution
since -many other variables and policies were taking place at the time.
-
37 -asset and liability management policies —andits effects on the corporate sector. Liquidity
management, in practice, has more layers. Argentina has considered liquidity requirements
in the banking sector. Central banks often respond to inflows by increasing domesticreserve
requirements. Until recently, Chile required the private sector to hold liquidity against short
term external financing. Each of these actions results in liquidity provisioning ata more
decentralized level. When is liquidity provisioning by the bankingsystem more or less
effective than that of the central bank? In assessing the international liquidity ofa country,
should we equally weight the holdings of the central bank and those of the domesticbanking
system? These are important questions that require, among other things, enriching the
framework to include a domestic banking sector. This remains somethingwe are working
on.
Similarly, while sterilization —and international liquidity management in general, in-
cluding external pnblic debt management— may be the tool of choice in the shortrun,
long term solutions to the problems we have highlighted are not cyclical but structural in
nature. Our framework not only illustrates the second best options and policy problems,
but also points at domestic financial underdevelopment as the primitive source ofconcern.
It is important when thinking about second best solutions to also ask whetherthey will
have any long run effects on the primitive problem. Taxing capital flows, for example, while
obviously appropriate from the second best point of view, and even useful as a companion
to sterilization, loses appeal once one thinks in terms of the medium and long term devel-
opment of financial markets. Flexible exchange rates may have an advantage over fixed -
forMundell-Fleming reasons -butthey may have long run detrimeutal effects on financial
markets.
Regardless of the specific answers to these concerns, it appears to us that there is an
increasing realization that a modern debate on issues such as the advantages and drawbacks
of dollarization, capital flows taxation, liquidity requirements, and soon, ought to consider
the asset markets aspects of the problem, and that the structure we have proposed here is




Taking as given date 0 decisions of k and there are four possible regions that the
economy can be in at date 1.
Region I occurs when both the international liquidity constraint (4) and the domestic
liquidity constraint (3) are slack. In this case, both the international liquidity premium
and the domestic illiquidity index are zero and there is full projectcompletion. L1 =
= 0,0=1.
• Region TI occurs when the international constraint is slack but the domestic constraint
is binding. The international liquidity premium remains atzero, however the domes-
tic illiquidity index is positive as the economy fails to aggregate all of its resources
resulting in some projects being downsized. L =1,s > 0. 0 <1
• Region III occurs when the international constraint is binding but the domestic con-
straint is slack. The economy aggregates all of its resources, however this is insufficient
in the aggregate and some projects are downsized. L1 >1,sj =0,0 <1.
• Region IV occurs when both the international constraint and the domestic constraint
are binding. The international liquidity premium and the domestic illiquidity index
are postives, and some projects are downsized. L1 >1,sj > 0,0 < 1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3 stated that under the assumption of suspension of convertibility and if dof =
thenforeigners will not hold any domestic claims at date 0. The proof is as follows.
Suppose that the private sector holds B goverment bonds, i-K domestic claims, and has
w —do,f=0.Suppose foreigners hold Bf government bonds. We show that Bf =0in
equihbrium.
When to— = 0,the government controls all of the international liquidity in the
economy. If the government suspends convertibility at date 1, it only releases reserves when
shown an invoice for an imported good to fulfill investment plans. The government from
soale of B + Bf bonds at date 0 has B±Bfofreserves.
Case I: Suppose that the foreigner goes to the central bank with Bf bonds and an invoice
for Bf/Ll import goods. Then the government releases B1/L1 reserves to the foreigner that
it uses to pay the cost of the import good. The foreigner must sell this to the domestic
distressed firm for Bf domestic claims. However, these claims have no value to foreigners
39since they will surely be repudiated at date 2. Thus, Bf =
CaseII: Suppose the foreigner goes to a domestic investor and offers Sf bonds for
international liquidity. Since dcf =w,domestics have none, and can only get international
liquidity by tendering bonds to the central bank. Suppose a domestic tenders B bonds to
the central bank, shows import goods of B/Li and then receives B/L1 reserves. However
these reserves will exactly pay for the import goods, hence the domestic will be left with
no liquidity to offer foreigners.
Finally let us show that only distressed firms will sell bonds to the central bank for its
international reserves.
Case III: Either distressed or intact firms can tender i-K + B —Tto the government for
B+Bj ofreserves. If intact firms tender, they onsell the imported goods to distressed firms
in exchange for some of rK + B —Tof distressed firms. Suppose an intact firm tenders
one domestic claim, it receives l/L1 import goods, which it sells to the distressed firm for
L1 domestic claims. Thus it is indifferent between tendering and not. Assume that it does
not.
Distressed firms receive all imported goods totalling,
rK-f-B-T
LFrom (7), this is exactly equal to B+B1 which is all of the governnient's reserves. Thus
when only distressed firms tender, this is an equilibrium.
34We have made two unrealistic assumptions here. First, we have said that foreigners cannot take the
imported goods and liquidate them outside the country for international liquidity. If there is any liquidation
cost in this transaction, it is easy to see that foreigners would prefer not to hold domestic claims, since
they must always bear this cost, while domestics never hear the cost. The more interesting case is that
of over-invoicing. During periods of capital-controls domestic firms routinely over-invoice their imported
goods. That is they claim higher prices than actual ones for their goods, thereby getting their hands on
more valuable international reserves. Suppose that a firm can get away with over-invoicing by a multiple of
ill> 1. A firm that tenders one unit of domestic claim receives -/—importgoods, and international
reserves. The import goods can be sold to a distressed firm, fordomestic claims. The international
reserves can now be sold to a foreigner to redeem some of the foreigner's bonds. Foreigners sellingBf bonds
can receive at maximum 2±& reserves. Thus let,
L — Bf i,f—
This is the discount that foreigners sell their bonds at. In equilibrium, foreigners will hold only enough
bonds so that L1,1 =L1.This means that a fraction.±' of international reseLves.can he promised away
to foreigners by the private sector at date 0. Over-invoicing creates a leak in the system.
40A.3 Proof of Propositon 3
Proposition 3 stated conditions under which the private sector completely undoes the central
banks sterilization operation.
Take prices first. Let us rewrite (7) to give,
Li(W —Do,f)+ 2L1 =rK+B —T.
Now suppose that Ic =Ic'and d01 =d'0f then,
Li(W-D4+L4 =rK'+B—T.
However, given the government's budget constraint, (6), we can conclude that L1 does not
depend on B.
Fixing prices at Lr =L,let us consider the firm's optimization problem and verify that
Ic =Ic.'and do,f =df is a solution. Since,
w — > 0,
it must also be that,







Thus the solutions satisfy the budget constraints. Since the objective of the program is
linear, they also satisfy the F.O.C's. The last part of the proposition, L0 =L1,follows from
domestic arbitrage. U
A.4Proof of Proposition 5
The statement is that when domestic secondary markets are illiquid and dof <w,steril-
ization can backire.
The proof is by showing that there is no other possible equilibrium. Suppose there was
an equilibrium with Ic <k'and L1 ￿ L. The private sector purchases the bonds through
increased borrowing and reduced expenditure. However if this is the case then from market
clearing we have a contradiction,
rK+(l—a)(B—T) rK' —
41Consider an equilibrium with L1 < L and K < K' -whereat least one of the inequalities
is strict. From the firm's first order conditions,
R+rA R+r#
e'(k) =_______ 1 = c'(k').
L V
Since c(k) is strictly convex, this is a contradiction. The case with L1 ￿ L and K ￿ K',
can be ruled out by the same logic. Hence the only equilibrium is, L1 CL,k > k', and
do,f>d'j+-. U
A.5Proof of Propostion 6
Proposition 6 derived optimal policy when secondary markets were illiquid.
At date 1, theprivate sector sells the government bonds in return for the international
liquidity. When a > 0, this transaction suffers a real cost. Thus intervention can be costly
because it requires the private sector to sell more bonds into an illiquid market. Policy can
result in a Pareto improvement as long as this cost is not too high. In the extreme case
when a =0,policy always leads to Pareto improvement.
First let us define U"
(P8) maaç0UPRIV(w don( + Li) + k(R + r)
s.t.dof <w
e(k) =dof.
The first order condition for this program is,
L1
The optimal choice is denoted k' to refer to the no-intervention point. The market clearing
condition remains that of (5).
Suppose that a central bank offered B bonds for sale at the interest rate of L0, but
bearing the illiquidity cost of a. This program must be altered as follows:
maxk4, (w —do)(A+ L) + k(R + r) + (b —T)(1+ (1— a))
s.t.do,j mu
c(k) -I-=do,f.
Since we require tht the central bank sell enough bonds so that dO,f =mu,we can rewrite
as:
rnaxk,bk(R+r)+(bT)(1+(1—a))
s.t.c(k) -1- -= mu.
42The first order condition for this program is,
1 R+r- c'(k) — L1
L0 1 + (1—




Let us now simplify this expression using the fact that the government's budget constraint
is T +=B.Then, this can be rewritten as,
1 rK =1+a (13)
Substituting this back into the objective in (P8) allows us to generate the welfare function
for the central planner assuming that it intervenes sufficiently so that dof =in. This
expression is given by,
_)+(W—c(K))2A. 1+a
The central bank can choose B to arrive at any point on this function. Thus, assuming




We can subtract the objective in UCP with that in (P8) to see how the private sector's




TK( + aA) (14) 1 + a
As in proposition 2, it is clear that the central planner values international liquidity higher
than the private sector, and domestic liquidity less. Thus the benefit of intervention is that
it moves the private sector away from a sub-optimal choice. That is, KCP .c K'. However
intervention has a cost, since firms must sell their bonds into an illiquid market. To compute
this cost let us substitute market clear condition for L1, (13), into (14):
UCt'_UU'J'=_a_1_rK. 1+a
Thus, it is clear that intervention always lowers the welfare function when a > 0. Inter-
vention is beneficial as long UCP(KCP) > U"1111t(K"'7). For a sufficiently small, this
inequality will hold. U.
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